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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, William L. Forsyth, anpeals from 
the order denying him the right to withdraw his plea of 
guilty and the judarnent and sentence of the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, Utah Countv, State of Utah, the Honorable 
J. Robert Bullock, presiding, 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable J. Robert Bullock, after a hearina 
on the Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, 
denied that motion on March 31st, 1976 and sentenced the 
Appellant to a term in the State Penitentary on April 
9th, 1976, with execution of that sentence stayed pending 
appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant respectfully requests that the order 
and judgment of the District Court, denying the Motion 
to withdraw the plea of guilty, be reversed and that 
Appellant be allowed to enter a plea of not guilty and 
be granted his right to a fair trial by an impartial jurv. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or about August 18th, 1975, Appellant was 
arraigned on five counts of theft by deception for alleged 
violations of Sections 76-6-405 and 76-6-412, Utah Code 
Ann. (1953 as amended). The charging statute and complaint 
describe this as a specific intent crime. The statute 
states: "Theft by deception. (1) A person commits theft 
if he obtains or exercises control over property of another 
by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof." 
Each of the five counts in the indictment contain the 
language that "at the time and place" the money was taken 
"by deception and with a purpose and intent to deprive 
said individuals of the same." 
Trial was' set for January 5th, 1976. On January 
5th, 1976, the trial was continued until February 2nd, 
1976 because Appellant and defense counsel had not then 
met together sufficiently to adequately prepare the defense. 
The reasons given by Appellant and his counsel for the 
delay were that Appellant had not been able to pay his 
attorney, and felt he could not reasonably make the ex-
tensive demands on the attorney's time necessary for ade-
quate preparation. (Hearing Transcript of January 5th, 
1976 P. 5). Appellant had been lead to believe by his 
attorney, that the attorney would be unable to successfully 
defend him against the charge because of Appellant's in-
ability to pay necessary fees and expenses. (Affidavit 
of February 27, 1976, p.3). As an additional concern to 
Mr. Forsyth at the time of the scheduled trial on January 
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5th, his attorney had before the Court a motion to withdraw 
as counsel. 
In a hearing before the Court on January 30th, 
1976, Appellant requested permission to change his plea 
as to Count 1 of the information and the State agreed 
to dismiss the remaining Counts, (Hearing Transcript of 
January 30th, 1976, p.2). When asked by the Court whether 
he was pleading guilty to Count 1 because he was quilty, 
Appellant initially responded that he was chanqing his 
plea for another reason. (Hearing Transcript of January 
30th, 1976, p.6). He had been lead to believe that he 
could plead "no contest" instead of quilty to Count 1. 
(Hearing Transcript of February 27th, 1976, p.3). After 
a brief conference in the hall with defense counsel and 
the prosecutor, Appellant made the plea of quilty. (Hearing 
Transcript of January 30th, 1976, p.8). During the con-
ference, the prosecutor commented to the Appellant that 
he would face a "red-necked" jury, which would probably 
convict him in all Counts, if he did not plead quilty, 
and both defense counsel and the prosecutor represented 
to Appellant that he would likely get probation by pleading 
guilty. (Affidavit of February 27th, 1976, p.3). 
On February 27th, 1976, prior to sentencing, 
Appellant petitioned to the Court to withdraw the plea of 
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guilty and substitute a plea of not guilty. Appellant 
asserted his innocence and that the plea was not knowinqly 
or voluntarily made because of the intimidations of the 
prosecutor and the lack of adequate representation and 
undue influence of defense counsel. (Affidavit of February 
27th, 1976). Defendant testified that he did not know that 
he was scheduled to enter a guilty plea until just five 
minutes prior to entering Court, thinking instead that 
he was to enter a "no contest" or nolo contendre plea. 
(Transcript of February 27th, 1976, p.3). 
On March 22, 1976, in a hearing to consider the 
motion to withdraw the plea, the Court heard a proffer of 
evidence from the State and from the defense. (Hearing 
Transcript of March 22, 1976). The Court employed a probable 
cause standard in accessing the sufficiency of the State's 
evidence to prove guilt. (Hearing Transcript of March 5, 
1976, p.25). Subsequently, on March 31, 1976, the Motion 
to withdraw the plea was denied, and Defendant was sentenced 
on April 9, 1976. From that order and sentence, the appeal 
is taken. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT MADE VOLUNTARILY, 
WITHOUT UNDUE INFLUENCE, OR UNDERSTANDINGLY. 
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The standard for a valid guilty plea is expressed 
in Strong v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 294, 452 P.2d 323 (1969), 
wherein it was stated that "a plea of guilty must be made 
voluntarily, without undue influence or coercion. . .w 
Id. at 296, 324. In that case it was further commented 
"that under some circumstances the extraction of a plea 
to one charge as a condition to the* dismissal of others 
might be used in such a manner as to amount to undue in-
fluence or coercion, which would negate the voluntariness 
of the plea." Id. at 296, 324. In the present case the 
prosecution's remarks to appellant concerning the appellant 
having to face a "red-necke'd" or hanging jury, constituted 
undue influence in exacting a plea of guilty as a condition 
for the dismissal of the other charges. 
Further, such pressure from the prosecution would 
be classified as a "subtle threat" within the meaning of 
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). It was said 
there that such acts might be "a perfect cover up of un-
constitutionality." Id. at 243. The prosecution did not 
at any time denv or refute these intimidating comments. 
In the face of such evidence, the trial court should have 
granted the motion to withdraw the plea and the denial of 
the motion constituted a denial of the Appellant's consti-
tutional rights to due process and a fair trial by an im-
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partial jury. 
The short delay between the entering of the plea 
and the assertion of innocence evidenced a strong indication 
that the plea was entered in haste and confusion. Confusion 
in the Appellant's mind as to the impact and the reasons 
for the plea was evident in his initial assertion to the 
Court that there was another reason for entering the plea 
besides making a plea of guilty. He did not want to admit 
guilt. He maintained that he was innocent. He had in 
fact made a tactical decision to plead "no contest" when 
faced with counsel's representations that adequate defense 
would not be forthcoming without pay. At the time Mr. 
Forsyth entered his plea of guilty, he was still under 
the opinion, in the words of his attorney, " . . . that unless 
he paid me I would not represent him. . . and that he was 
embarrassed and felt it would be futile to contact me until 
he had raised some money." (Hearing Transcript of January 
5th, 1976, p.5). Appellant was unable to raise any money 
for his attorney and under all these pressures resigned 
himself to entering a "no contest" plea. His dilemma was 
further compounded when five minutes prior to entering his 
plea he was informed that "no contest" was not a valid plea 
and was confronted with the subtle threats in the hall from 
the prosecution and his own defense attorney. (Hearing 
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Transcript of Feb. 27, 1976f p.3). 
As lon$ ago as State v. Lee Lim, 79 Utah 68, 89, 
7 P.2d 825, 833, (1932) this Court gave the indication that 
a guilty plea that was "influenced unduly or improperly 
either by hope or fear, or that . . . was entered by reason 
of mistake or misapprehension or undue influence," should 
properly be allowed to be withdrawn. If Appellant's af-
fidavit and other arguments made to the Court concerning 
the undue influence exerted on the Appellant were inadequate 
to satisfy the District Court, then Appellant's offer of 
further sworn testimony should have been accepted. (Hearing 
Transcript of March 5, 197 6, p.3) 
With a showing of undue influence on the part 
of the prosecution and the misunderstanding on the part 
of the Appellant, the Appellant should have been granted 
his right to withdraw the plea to insure preservation of 
his constitutional rights to due process and a fair jury 
trial. 
The transcript of the hearing of January 30th, 
at which time the plea of guilty was entered must be con-
sidered in light of the evidence contained in Appellant's 
affidavit in Support of Motion to Withdraw Plea and other 
evidence before the Court. The Appellant claims that 
he only "acted out" his required role before Judge Bullock, 
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having been intimidated and coerced into saying what the 
Court, his attorney and the prosecutor obviously wanted, 
to allow the guilty plea to be accepted. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN USING A PROBABLE CAUSE 
STANDARD OF PROOF IN ASSERTAINING IF 
THERE WAS A FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE PLEA OF GUILTY 
Probable cause is the standard of proof applied 
to justify a search or seizure. U.S. Constituion, Amendment 
IV, Utah Constitution, Art. I, §14. The assertion of prob-
able cause must be supported by sworn oath or affirmation 
before the Court. Id. The Defendant, his counsel and the 
prosecutor stipulated to the Courtfs hearing an offer of 
proof of the evidence against the accused and in his defense. 
The Court determined that such offer of proof would be 
unsworn and considered on the basis of probable cause. 
(Hearing Transcript of March 5, 1976, p.5). 
Since the rendering, acceptance and retemtion 
of a guilty plea over the objections of the accused is an 
even more serious action than a search or seizure and con-
stitutes at least a waiver of a basic constitutional right, 
it requires a higher standard of proof than a mere showing 
of probable cause. A guilty plea in fact becomes more than 
a waiver of constitutional rights; it is itself a conviction. 
Boykin, supra, at 242. 
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The Appellant's plea of guilty and statement that 
he was gulity were later offset by his frequent assertions 
and claims of innocence. In North Carolina v. Alfordy 
400 U.S. 25, 27 (1974) the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
a factual basis for accepting a plea of guilty which was 
coupled with assertions of innocence, was adequately es-
tablished with the showing of "strong evidence of guilt". 
This required standard is a higher 'level of proof than the 
"reasonable grounds to believe" test and the "what the State 
thought it could prove and intended to prove" standard as 
used in this case. (Hearing Transcript of March 22f 1976, 
p.18). 
Considering the qravity, impact and finality of 
a guilty plea, the Court should have used a higher level 
of proof and required strong and convincing evidence from 
the prosecution before denying the Motion to withdraw the 
plea. 
POINT III 
EVEN IF A PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD OF PROOF 
WAS NOT PROPER, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
NOT ADEQUATELY ASCERTAINING IF THERE WAS 
A FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE PLEA OF GUILTY. 
The Federal Courts have stressed that "guilt pleas 
coupled with claims of innocence should not be accepted 
unless there is a factual basis for the plea. . ." North 
Carolina v. Alford, supra, at 38. In Alford the denied 
withdrawal of the plea was not an abuse of discretion because 
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the prosecution presented "strong evidence of guilt and 
the defendant had no substantial evidentary support for 
the claim of innocence. In determining the factual basis 
for the plea in Alford, the Court heard the sv/orn testimonies 
of a police officer who summarized the State's case, two 
other witnesses, and the defendant. That evidence was held 
to be sufficiently strong to prevent a reversal. 
In the present case such "strong evidence", to 
establish the required factual basis is absent. (See Tran-
script of Hearings of March 22, 1976). There were only 
the assertions of the prosecutor as to what the State's 
evidence would be. Even if probable cause was th€> proper 
standard of proof to apply, oath or affirmation was not 
made supporting the showing of probable cause. There was 
no sworn testimony. There were no affidavits or depositions 
i 
of witnesses. Even the integrity of some of the prosecutions 
recorded information was challenged by defense counsel. 
(Hearing Transcript of March 22, 1976, p.17, 18). The 
losses of one of the alleged victims were challenged, but 
were not substantiated by the prosecution. When defense 
counsel challenged the pjroposed evidence as inadmissable, 
no attempt was made to establish its admissability. 
A credible claim of meritorious defenses was also 
raised by defense counsel undermining any claim the pro-
secution may have had for strong evidence of guilt. Defense 
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counsel raised substantial issue as to whether the pros-
ecution could prove the required intent of the alleged 
crime. Here again, no sworn testimony or any direct evidence 
was offered to establish a factual basis for that element. 
Without adequate, strong evidence establishing a factual 
basis for the plea, it was error to deny the withdrawal 
of the plea. 
POINT IV 
THE DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
THE GUILTY PLEA WAS AN ABUSE OF THE COURT'S DIS-
CRETION RESULTING IN MANIFEST INJUSTICE AND UNFAIRNESS. 
No prejudice to the State would have ensued with 
the granting of the Motion to withdraw the plea as was 
admitted by the prosecution, but by denying the motion 
the trial Court prevented the Appellant from getting a 
fair trial before an impartial jury. Further, since the 
motion was a pre-sentence request, it was not a hidden 
challenge to the Judge's sentence. The fact that the 
Appellant asserted his legal innocence was an important 
factor to be weighed. Indeed, in such cases a pre-sentence 
withdrawal should be freely granted. United States v. Joslin, 
140 U.S. App. DC 252, 434 F2d 526 (1970). 
POINT V 
APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE COUNSEL 
IN REGARD TO MAKING THE PLEA OF GUILTY. 
Appellant assorted by affidavit that defense 
counsel led him to believe that because he was unable to 
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pay counsel that his defense would be jeopardized. Ap-
pellant further maintained that the defense counsel had 
not adequately represented him from the time the continuance 
was granted on January 5, 1976, until the time that the 
Appellant requested withdrawal of the plea. Although 
Appellant expressed the feeling that the defense counsel 
was capable of adequately representing him, and in fact 
he desired that defense counsel continue to represent him 
because of his familiarity with the case, Appellant did 
maintain that representation had been inadequate and mis-
leading during the time the guilty plea was entered. 
Counsel had lead him to believe that an adequate defense 
could not be presented without prepayment of fees to the 
attorney and payment of professional fees to an accountant, 
(Hearing Transcript of January 5, 1976f p.7)f and that 
Appellant could likely expect probation by pleading guilty. 
There was direct implication made that Defendant would 
be treated more strictly with a finding of guilt as opposed 
to a plea of guilt. Neither contention was contested by 
either defense counsel or the prosecution. Such actions 
on the part of the defense counsel caused fear and mis-
apprehension for the Appellant of undesirable consequences 
if he did not plead guilty. 
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The importance of safeguarding the right to 
adequate counsel at the time of the entry of a guilty plea 
was emphasized in Alires v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118, 121, 
449 P.2d 241, 243 (1969). Such a challenge to the adequecy 
of counsel as in the present case merited further inquiry 
by the Court or at least rebuttal by the prosecution. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant contends that the guilty plea was 
made under the stress of undue influence and coercion from 
the prosecution and defense counsel and that he should 
have the right to withdraw that plea. Further, it is 
contended that the trial Court abused its discretion 
by denying the withdrawal, resulting in manifest injustice 
to Appellant. No prejudice to the State would have ensued, 
but the Appellant, asserting innocence was denied a hearing 
before an impartial jury. Additionally, in the face of 
Appellantfs claims of innocence, no adequate factual basis 
for accepting the plea was established. Appellant was 
further denied the right to effective counsel because of 
his financial circumstances. 
Appellant therefore respectfully requests that 
the judgment of the lower court be reversed to allow Ap-
pellant to withdraw the plea of guilty and substitute a 
plea of not guilty. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Steven L. Grow, 
Attorney for Appellant 
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